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1 Introduction
A salient property of most environmental amenities is that they cannot be (easily) trans-
ported from one location to another. By contrast, the end products of polluting and
resource-extracting industries typically enter international exchange. As an example,
consider a pristine forest, which can be either preserved or developed. Whereas prod-
ucts such as timber, pulp and paper are traded in international markets, environmental
amenities like scenic beauty and clean air, or the capacity of the forest to protect the
land against erosion, are in general site-dependent and non-transportable. Thus interna-
tional exchange is rather diﬃcult, and as a general rule amenities are consumed at the
site of production. In this sense amenities resemble typical home market goods, say,
the services provided by a local theater or barbershop.
One of the functions, or side eﬀects, of environmental policy is then to inßuence
the allocation of resources between tradable and non-tradable goods. This paper argues
that this function may generate incentives to abuse environmental policy. If decisions
are made in a decentralized manner (at a local or national level), there can be too much
extraction of resources and too little preservation.
To present the argument, the paper develops a two-region, three-sector model of
economic geography. The manufacturing sector produces a large number of diﬀerenti-
ated variates, features increasing returns to scale, monopolistic competition and costly
transportation, and uses mobile capital as its sole input. In order to economize in trans-
portation costs, both regions would like to have a large share of manufacturing.1 Natural
resources and environmental amenities are both derived from environmental resources by
constant returns to scale. While natural resources are internationally tradable, ameni-
ties are non-tradable. The task of environmental policy is to allocate environmental
resources between the alternative uses. As we assume that environmental problems are
local, the standard externality problem can be addressed at the regional level. However,
1This cost-of-living eﬀect also motivates strategic environmental policy in Markusen et al. (1995)
and Pßuger (2001). More generally, it motivates trade policy, and many other forms of public policies
in models of economic geography. See e.g. Baldwin et al .(2003) and references therein.
1
in order to attract manufacturing Þrms, regional policy-makers face incentives to con-
vert too big a share of environmental resources into tradable natural resources. This
is because development increases the size of the local market, which in turn makes the
region more attractive as a manufacturing location. We also show that the incentives to
overdevelop vanish, (i) if also the end products of development (natural resources) are
non-tradable, or (ii) if there are technologies, such as ecotourism, which allow amenities
to enter international exchange.
To understand these Þndings, the following simple thought experiments may be help-
ful. Consider a two-sector economy, which is identical to our model, except for the fact
that there are no environmental amenities. Then assume that the production of natu-
ral resources in one of the regions increases, say there is technological progress, or new
reserves are found. As a consequence, the income of that region rises.2 If both natural
resources and manufactured goods are normal, people increase their consumption in both
categories. The region exports more natural resources (or imports less), and there is a
demand spillover to the manufacturing sector.
Next consider the same situation, but the second sector is environmental amenities
(or barbershops), instead of natural resources. Then for some reason the quality of
the environment improves (the barbers become more productive), and more amenities
become available. While this certainly ameliorates the standard of living, there are no
pecuniary externalities to the manufacturing sector. As amenities are internationally
non-tradable, it is not possible to raise exports and shift a part of the extra consumption
to manufactured goods. The improved availability of amenities simply implies more local
consumption of amenities. Likewise it is easy to conclude that while a deterioration
in the quality of the environment is bad for utility, it does not lower the demand for
manufactured goods.
Combining these two thought experiments, and going back to the original model,
gives the entire picture. Now the increase in the production of natural resources is
not a result of technological change, but it is achieved at the expense of lower envi-
2If the country exports natural resources, we have to assume that the negative terms of trade eﬀect
is not too pervasive.
2
ronmental quality. As the tradable natural resources generate demand spillovers to the
manufacturing sector, while non-tradable amenities generate no spillovers, the demand
for manufactured products increases, which attracts more manufacturing to the region.
However, reallocating resources between two non-tradable or two tradable sectors has no
eﬀects on the third industry. Thus if natural resources are non-tradable, or if amenities
can enter international exchange, there are no incentives to deviate from socially optimal
policies.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no previous studies analyzing what implica-
tions the non-tradability of amenities may have on environmental policy3. Nevertheless,
the paper has connections to several branches of literature. First, we use a variant of
the (so called) footloose capital (FC) model of economic geography (see e.g. Baldwin et
al. 2003, especially Ch. 3, or Martin and Rogers 1995). The FC model has a number
of characteristics, which make it appealing for policy analysis. It has a unique analyti-
cally tractable equilibrium, but it still captures the home market eﬀect: the size of the
market aﬀects Þrm location.4 Recently, the FC approach has been used for analyzing
several policy issues including the supply of public infrastructure, capital taxation and
tax competition, regional transfers and trade policy (see Baldwin et al. 2003, and ref-
erences therein). In particular, Pßuger (2001) studies environmental taxation in the FC
framework; this paper will be discussed in more detail below.5
Second, this paper shares some common ground with the literature on resource-led
growth, which emphasizes the role of home market demand, deriving from a leading
sector such as agriculture or natural resources, in industrialization and economic develop-
ment. While the argument has often been formalized in a closed economy framework (see
e.g. Murphy et al. (1989a)), Sachs and Warner (1999) and Buﬃe (1992) demonstrate
how resource-led growth may arise in a three-sector open economy. These authors also
3However, some work has ben done on how to regulate polluting sectors producing tradable and non-
tradable goods. Typically, a key question here is whether an individual country has strategic reasons to
regulate tradable and non-tradable sectors diﬀerently. See e.g. Rauscher (1994, 1997).
4Empirically, the home market eﬀect has been documented by e.g. Davis and Weinstein (1998,1999).
5There is also an interesting recent paper by Rauscher (2003), who analyzes how environmental
policies aﬀect the location of polluting activities
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show that the assumptions concerning trading costs in diﬀerent sectors play a key role
in determining whether or not demand spillovers from natural resources or agriculture
favor the modern part of the economy.6 The policies of resource-led growth have been
advocated by economists and policy-makers7, and there is also some empirical evidence
in favor of the hypothesis (as well as against it)8. In our model both regions follow the
policies of resource mobilization, which however backÞre in equilibrium, as the regions
end up competing for the same manufacturing investments.
Finally, there is an important connection to the literature on environmental policy
and Þrm location. Recent empirical studies, typically using panel data, have indicated
that environmental regulations do matter, when Þrms choose where to open new plants.9
As it is no doubt the case in reality, these papers assume that the main connection
from environmental policy to Þrm location runs through production costs. However, this
paper suggests, that there may also be a secondary link on the demand side, via the size
of the market.
Theoretical papers have then studied whether Þrm delocation and capital mobility
may generate incentives to abuse decentralized (national or local) environmental policy
in an economy, where more direct and eﬃcient strategic tools, such as investment subsi-
dies, or various trade policy instruments, cannot be applied (due to e.g. WTO rules)10.
In a simple benchmark model with constant returns to scale and perfect competition,
6In an open economy a natural resource boom may also lead to a Dutch disease: under certain
circumstances, the modern sector shrinks. For a survey of the Dutch disease literature, see e.g. Corden
(1984).
7For a review of ealier economic literature, see e.g. Murphy et al. (1989a). A leading example
presented in this paper is sir Arthur Lewis who in 1953 makes increases in farm productivity and in
cash crop exports a cornerstone of his proposed development strategy for the Gold Coast. In a famous
quote, cited by Murphy et al.(1989b) a Venezuelan minister states that expanding oil production is like
sowing the seeds of development.
8For supporting evidence see e.g. Murphy et al. (1989a) and Duranton (1998), and references therein.
More skeptikal Þndings are reported e.g. by Sachs and Warner (1999).
9See e.g. Becker and Henderson (2000), Greenstone (2002), Henderson (1996), Keller and Levinson
(2002), List and Co (2000), List et al. (2003).
10This limited-policy-space assumption is evidently also adopted in this paper. A critical appraisal of
the assumption can be found for example in the recent survey by Copeland and Taylor (2004).
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environmental policies conducted by small countries are optimal, as long as there is no
transboundary pollution (Oates and Schwab (1988)). If countries are large, the manipu-
lation of the rental rate of capital is a possible source of socially non-optimal policies (e.g.
van Long and Siebert (1991)). In models of imperfect competition, decentralized envi-
ronmental policies may be too lax (ecological dumping), but under certain circumstances
also excessively stringent (not in my backyard or NIMBY) regulations are adopted in
equilibrium. Markusen et al. (1995), Rauscher (1995) and Hoel (1997) establish these
results in a framework with two countries and a single imperfectly competitive Þrm.
Pßuger (2001) reaches similar conclusions in a model with monopolistic competition.11
In these models there are several interregional spillover eﬀects, which arise from Þrms
market power, transportation costs, changes in tax revenue, as well as environmental
problems. These spillovers are partly positive and partly negative12, opening up the
possibilities of both ecological dumping and NIMBY.13
Of the papers discussed above, the contribution by Pßuger (2001) falls closest to
the present paper, since Pßuger (2001) analyzes strategic environmental policy in a FC-
type model. However, the model variant adopted by Pßuger diﬀers somewhat from our
framework, reßecting the diﬀerent focus of these studies. In particular, Pßuger uses
a model version with quasi-linear utility, which eliminates income eﬀects in individual
demand functions.14 Although the market size still aﬀects Þrm location in this model
variant (if regional population changes), changes in per capita income have no eﬀect.
This assumption then cuts down the demand side eﬀect of environmental policy. By
contrast, the focus of the present paper is on the demand side linkage, as this allows
11Also, Ulph and Valentini (2001) show, in a duopoly model, that the fact that plants are footloose,
when environmental policies are set, does not necessarily increase the extent of ecological dumping.
12Reducing a home regions emission taxes induces a relocation of capital and Þrms into the home
region. After the policy change, the prices charged by Þrms located in the home region are lower
and local pollution is reduced in the other regions which is beneÞcial to foreign households; however
foreigners also have to import more, which increases transport costs, and foreign tax income is reduced.
13As discussed by e.g. Rauscher (1995) and Pßuger (2001), the ineﬃciency in the choice of emission
taxes relies on the absence of additional policy instruments.
14A textbook treatment of the quasi-lnear FC model, with some comparison to the standard FC
framework, can be found in Baldwin et al. (2003, Ch 16.2).
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the analysis of (non)tradability issues. To communicate the main message as sharply
as possible, we have then adopted a framework where environmental policy has no cost
side eﬀects on manufacturing: our model assumes that the manufacturing sector is clean.
This assumption also simpliÞes the logic of strategic environmental policy, in the sense
that only the interregional spillovers arising from transportation costs remain.15 As a
result, in equilibrium decentralized environmental policy can be either socially optimal
or excessively lax; the NIMBY alternative is ruled out16.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Model basics are presented in
Section 2. Section 3 studies the location of manufacturing Þrms. Section 4 analyzes
environmental policy, and characterizes the social optimum. Section 5 shows that the
decentralized equilibrium of the model is ineﬃcient under the basic set of assumptions,
with tradable natural resources and non-tradable amenities. Section 6 then demonstrates
that decentralized policies are socially eﬃcient if both natural resources and amenities
are either non-tradable or tradable. Finally Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
The economy consists of two identical regions, indexed by i = 1, 2, and produces two
types of goods: manufactured commodities and natural resources. Manufactures are
composed of a large number of diﬀerentiated goods, each produced out of capital subject
to economies of scale, with a monopolistically competitive market structure. The per-
fectly competitive natural resource sector converts environmental amenities into tradable
homogenous goods with a constant returns to scale technology.
There is an equal number of immobile consumers living in both regions. Consumers
are all identical and derive utility out of consumption and environmental amenities. They
15The remaining three channels, analyzed by e.g. Pßuger (2001), are eliminated as (i) environmen-
tal policy does not aﬀect pricing in the imperfectly competitive sector, (ii) mobile Þrms or factors of
production are not taxed (iii) the mobile sector does not pollute.
16Given that the model is deliberately designed in such a way that all cost side linkages from environ-
mental policy to Þrm location are eliminated, this result can hardly be taken as strong evidence against
NIMBY. The Þnding is probably best interpreted as an indication that demand side eﬀects, when acting
on their own, can give rise to ecological dumping, but not NIMBY.
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all share the Cobb-Douglas utility function
U = CαMC
β
RE
γ (1)
where CM is consumption of manufactured goods, CR consumption of natural resources
and E environmental amenities. The parameters α,β and γ are positive and add up to
unity.
There is a trade-oﬀ between the production of natural resources and the quality of the
environment. For each unit of natural resources (S) extracted, one unit of environmental
amenities (Q) is lost
Q = ω − S (2)
where ω is a parameter describing the pristine environment. As we shall below consider a
situation, where amenities can be traded internationally, we make a distinction between
regional consumption (Ei) and production (Qi) of amenities.
The key characteristics of the manufacturing sector are monopolistic competition and
product diﬀerentiation. To incorporate both of these aspects into the model, we adopt
the familiar approach of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), in assuming that the manufactured
aggregate is a CES-function of a large number (m) of diﬀerentiated commodity varieties
CM =
"
mX
i=1
c
σ−1
σ
i
# σ
σ−1
(3)
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.
There are n1 manufacturing Þrms in region 1 and n2 Þrms in region 2, each producing
a single product variety. A major objective of our analysis will be to see how environmen-
tal policy aﬀects this regional distribution of manufacturing. Firms within each location
are symmetric and serve both locations, a Þrm located in region 1 and 2 charging prices
p1 and p2, respectively. Transporting manufactured goods is costly. Transportation costs
take the Samuelson ice-berg form17 making consumer prices in regions 1 and 2 p1 and
p2 for domestic varieties, and p2τ and p1τ for imports, where τ > 1 is a measure of
17If x units of a commodity are exported, only x/τ , τ > 1, units reach the destination. The rest
melts under way.
7
transportation costs. Transportation costs also aﬀect the general consumer price level of
each region, captured by the CES−price indices
P1 = [n1p
1−σ
1 + n2(p2τ )
1−σ]
1
1−σ
P2 = [n1(p1τ)
1−σ + n2p21−σ]
1
1−σ
(4)
In addition to indicating how much utility consumers can achieve with a certain income,
the price indices, depending on the number and the regional distribution of Þrms, also
serve to measure the intensity of competition in the regional markets.
To assess Þrms proÞtability, we need to know their sales.18 We denote the total
expenditure of consumers living in regions 1 and 2 on manufactured varieties by y1 and
y2. Consumer maximization implies that a Þrms share of the expenditure depends on
the price it charges, compared to the general price level in the region:
p1x1 = (
p1
P1
)1−σy1 + (
p1τ
P2
)1−σy2
p2x2 = (
p2
P2
)1−σy2 + (p2τP1 )
1−σy1
(5)
The Þrst term on the right hand side of equations (5) refers to domestic sales and the
second term to foreign sales; x1 and x2 denote the quantity sold by the representative
Þrm located in region 1 and 2. The equations (5) will, in a moment, allow us to deter-
mine the equilibrium distribution of Þrms, given transportation costs and total regional
expenditures. Before that, however, we must have a brief look at the production side.
Capital is the only input needed in manufacturing. We Þx the size of the aggregate
capital stock to unity and assume that all consumers own an equal share of the stock.
Capital is mobile between regions; we denote the share of the stock allocated to region
1 by k, where k ∈ [0, 1].
Increasing returns to scale arise from the presence of Þxed costs and constant marginal
costs. To produce x units of a manufactured variety
K = a+ bx (6)
18The following results arising from consumer and Þrm optimization are standard, and we report them
rather brießy. For a more detailed account, see e.g. Krugman (1991) or Fujita et al. (1999, Ch. 4).
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units of capital are needed. ProÞt maximization by Þrms implies that the prices charged
are equal to marginal costs, plus a constant mark-up: p1 = σσ−1br1, p2 =
σ
σ−1br1, where
r1 and r2 are the rental rates of capital, in regions 1 and 2, respectively.
Because of free entry, Þrms must earn zero proÞts in equilibrium. There is a unique
level of operation x = a(σ−1)
b
, at which sales are just big enough to cover the Þxed costs;
at a larger scale there would be a proÞt, at a smaller scale a loss. As the equilibrium
level of production x depends on parameters, only, it is possible to show, with the help
of equation (6), that the number of Þrms is proportional to the amount of capital: with
an appropriate choice of units we can simply write n1 = kaσ , n2 =
1−k
aσ
.
Finally, choosing units of measurement appropriately, we can simplify these equations
without any loss of generality19 (see Fujita et al. (1999), p. 54). Setting b = σ−1
σ
and
a = σ−1, the pricing equation becomes pi = ri for i = 1, 2, the output level at which Þrms
make no proÞts is x = 1, and the regional distribution of manufacturing is measured by
the index of capital allocation n1 = k and n2 = 1− k.
As a summary of model basics, it may be useful to remark that our framework is
the footloose capital model (Baldwin et. al 2003, Ch. 3) with the following modiÞca-
tions: (i) On top of manufactured goods and natural resources20, there are environmental
amenities. (ii) Both constant returns to scale sectors (natural resources and amenities)
use environmental resources, while only capital is needed in manufacturing;21 thus the
(clean) manufacturing sector is aﬀected by environmental policy only through the home
market eﬀect.22
19It can be shown that the outcome of the environmental policy - Þrm location game is unaﬀected by
these normalizations.
20Following a standard practice in the literature, Baldwin et al.(2003) call the constant returns to
scale sector agriculture.
21In the standard FC model the agricultural sector employs regionally immobile labor, while both
labor and mobile capital are needed in manufacturing.
22A brief comparison to typical center-periphery models (e.g. Krugman 1991) can be found at the
end of the next section.
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3 Firm location
This section studies the equilibrium location of manufacturing Þrms. In particular, we
want to show that, with given environmental policies, this allocation is unique.
To Þnd the equilibrium of the manufacturing location subgame, we solve the equations
(5) for the rental rates of capital, r1 and r2, in terms of market sizes, y1 and y2, and
regional price levels P1 and P2:
rσ1 = P
σ−1
1 y1 + (P2τ
−1)σ−1y2
rσ2 = P2
σ−1y2 + (P1τ−1)σ−1y1
(7)
These equations tell that a Þrm located in region i can pay a high yield if it has good
access (no transportation costs) to a large market (high yi) with little competition (high
Pi). The equilibrium allocation of manufacturing Þrms may assume two diﬀerent forms:
(i) In an interior equilibrium, with k ∈ (0, 1), optimization by investors implies that
capital must earn the same rental rate in both regions. (ii) In an end point equilibrium
all production is in one region. To rule out proÞtable deviations, the rental rate paid
by a hypothetical Þrm moving to the periphery must be lower than that earned in the
center.
We start with the interior equilibrium, and require that r1 = r2 = 1.23 Then using
equations (7) and (4) shows that nominal yield is equalized between regions if
[k + (1− k)φ] y2 = [(1− k) + kφ] y1 (8)
where φ ≡ τ1−σ measures the freeness of trade; this freeness rises from φ = 0, with
inÞnite trading costs, to φ = 1, with zero trading costs. A notable feature in equation (8)
is that it is linear in k, and thus has a unique solution. Exploiting the fact that aggregate
expenditure on manufactured goods must be equal to capital income, y1 + y2 = 1 and
23That is, we use capital as the numeraire.
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thus yj = 1− yi, the solution to (8) is24
ni =
1
2
+
1 + φ
1− φ
µ
yi − 1
2
¶
(9)
The condition (9) describes the equilibrium allocation of manufacturing Þrms, as long as
it implies an ni which is economically meaningful, that is 0 ≤ ni ≤ 1. This is the case,
if the diﬀerence in market sizes is not too big: for an interior equilibrium to exists, we
must have yi ∈
h
φ
1+φ
, 1
1+φ
i
. If yi lies outside these bounds, the equilibrium is of type (ii),
and all industry is clustered in the region with the bigger market. Thus
ni =

0 if yi <
φ
1+φ
1
2
+ 1+φ
1−φ
¡
yi − 12
¢
if yi ∈ [ φ1+φ , 11+φ ]
1 if yi > 11+φ
(10)
The equation (10) sows that the regional allocation of manufacturing depends on the
size of the market. The region with the bigger market attracts more Þrms. As the share
of imports decreases, this also lowers the price level: plugging (10) into (4) gives the price
indices as a function of market sizes
Pi =

τ if yi <
φ
1+φ
(1 + φ)
1
1−σ y
1
1−σ
i if yi ∈ [ φ1+φ , 11+φ ]
1 if yi > 11+φ
(11)
The size of the market it aﬀected by environmental policy. The exact form of this
relation depends on the assumptions concerning the (non)tradability of environmental
amenities and natural resources. These linkages are studied in more detail in sections 5
and 6, and now we simply denote them by
yi = yi(Si, Sj) (12)
To better understand why our FC-type model has a unique, algebraically solvable
equilibrium, it may be useful to brießy contrast the present framework to the well-
known center-periphery model by Krugman (1991). In the center-periphery model there
24Although the notation is somewhat diﬀerent, the equation (8) is identical to the equation 3.12 in
Baldwin et al. (2003), characterizing the long run equilibrium of the FC model.
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are two key mechanisms which give rise to circular causation, and create self-reinforcing
agglomerations and multiple equilibria. First, there is a linkage from Þrm location to
production costs. As mobile workers care about real wages, Þrms operating in the center,
where the price level tends to be lower, can oﬀer lower nominal wages and still attract
labor. Second there is a linkage from industry location to market size, as purchasing
power is embodied in mobile manufacturing workers.25 Both of these mechanisms are
eliminated in our framework, where the reward of footloose capital is repatriated to
immobile consumer-investors, who base their decisions on nominal yields.26
4 Environmental policy
We can now proceed to the analysis of environmental policy. Our primary aim is to
demonstrate that decentralized decision-making may result in a race to the bottom,
with excessive development and a too low quality of the environment. This is done, of
course, by comparing the decentralized solution to the (second best27) social optimum
The aim of the social planner is to divide environmental resources between preser-
vation and development so as to maximize social welfare. When deciding how much
natural resources to extract the planner must take into account the trade-oﬀ between re-
source extraction and environmental amenities (1), the regional price levels (4), the way
in which the regional distribution of manufacturing is determined (10) and the linkage
between environmental policy and consumers purchasing power (12). Denoting the indi-
rect utility function of a representative consumer residing in region i = 1, 2 by Vi(Si, Sj),
where j 6= i, the maximization problem is of the form:
25Another mechanism linking Þrm location to market size is analyzed by Krugman and Venables
(1995): manufactured varieties are not demanded by consumers only but also by manufacturing Þrms,
which use them as intermediate goods.
26For more discussion, see Baldwin et al. (2003).
27The social planner only sets environmental policies in the two regions. The distortions in the manu-
facturing sector are not addressed. Notice also that unlike in Pßuger (2001), environmental regulations
have no eﬀect on the pricing of the monopolistically competitive manufacturing Þrms. This is because
environmental resources are not used as an input in the manufacturing sector.
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max
S1,S2
V1(S1, S2) + V2(S2, S1)
subject to (1), (4), (10), (12),
(Indirect utility functions are derived in the appendix.) Given the symmetry of the
model, it turns out to be optimal to develop the same amount of resources in both regions.
Thus the regions do not diﬀer in terms of purchasing power, and an equal number of
manufacturing plants are opened in both locations, k = 1
2
. Then the characterization
of the optimum boils down to the familiar requirement that at the margin, developed
and preserved environmental resources should make the same contribution to consumers
welfare. This condition of equal marginal utility can be expressed in the form
∂U
∂Ei
=
∂U
∂CRi
(13)
or equivalently
Si
Qi
=
β
γ
(14)
When environmental policy is determined in a decentralized manner, the regions
only care for the well-being of their own citizens, and the optimization problem facing
environmental authorities in region i is of the form
max
Si
Vi(Si, Sj)
subject to (1), (4), (12), (10)
The appendix shows that the symmetric equilibrium of the game is characterized by the
Þrst order conditions28
28The appendix also analyzes the conditions for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies. Under the basic set of assumptions, with tradable natural resources and non-tradable ameni-
ties, such an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist if µ ≡ αα+β > 2 φ1+φ . If this requirement is met there is
always some manufacturing in both regions, independently of environmental policies; the equilibrium of
the location subgame is of type (i), as deÞned in the previous section. If both amenities and natural
resources are either tradable or non-tradable, the (socially optimal) symmetric equilibrium always exists.
The appendix also shows that there cannot be any asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies. Thus the
symmetric equilibrium, if it exists, is unique (at least in pure strategies).
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∂U
∂Ei
=
∂U
∂CRi
+
∂U
∂CMi
∂CMi
∂Pi
∂Pi
∂ni
∂ni
∂yi
∂yi
∂Si
for i = 1, 2 (15)
While the left-hand side of (15) is the marginal utility of environmental amenities and
the Þrst term on the right-hand side reßects marginal utility from natural resources, the
second term on the right-hand side captures the potential incentives to abuse environ-
mental policy. Decentralized policies can be socially optimal if and only if this strategic
term vanishes when the planners solution, characterized by (13) or (14), is implemented.
Next, by analyzing the expression ∂Ui
∂CMi
∂CMi
∂Pi
∂Pi
∂ni
∂ni
∂byi ∂yi∂Si into its constituent elements,
the logic of strategic environmental policy can be reiterated. As the term ∂Ui
∂CMi
∂CMi
∂Pi
=
−αUi
Pi
indicates, the strategic twists in environmental regulation are motivated by the
attempt to lower the regional price level and thereby increase the utility consumers derive
from the consumption of manufactured varieties. The term ∂Pi
∂ni
= −1−φ
σ−1P
σ
i then tells that
the price level can be lowered by attracting new manufacturing Þrms and thus reducing
the share of imports. At the same time the cost of living rises in the other region, which
loses manufacturing Þrms, but this negative spillover is not taken into account. Next,
the term ∂ni
∂yi
= 1+φ
1−φ states that the way to attract Þrms is to increase the size of the
market. Finally the term ∂yi
∂Si
says that environmental policy is a tool by which market
size can be manipulated. Now, upon simpliÞcation, the Þrst order conditions (15) take
the form29
Si
Qi
=
β + α
σ−1
∂yi
∂Si
Si
γ
(16)
indicating that in our model decentralized policy may not be socially eﬃcient. Whether
or not this is the case, depends, however, on the exact form of the linkage between
environmental policy and market size.
29Notice that the freeness of trade parameter φ does not appear in this formula. This may seem
somewhat surprising, since the aim of environmental policy is to economize in transportation costs.
This feature of the model arises from the combination of two countervailing eﬀects: The higher the
transportation costs, (i) the more the allocation of manufacturing aﬀects utility, but (ii) the less the size
of the market matters for Þrm location. Given the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman approach, with CES-utility
and iceberg transportation costs, these eﬀects exactly cancel out each other. See also the appendix: the
parameter φ only enters the indirect utility function as a multiplier.
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5 Inefficient equilibrium
This section studies the equilibrium of the model under the basic set assumptions, with
tradable natural resources and non-tradable amenities. In equilibrium, local consumption
of amenities must be matched by local supply
Ei = Qi (17)
Notice that equation (17) is valid both (i) when the environment is strictly a non-market
good and (ii) when there are regional markets for (certain aspects of ) amenities; say local
consumers can buy recreational services. On the other hand, the balance of payments
condition
yi + PRCRi =
1
2
+ PRSi (18)
must hold for traded goods, where PR is the price of natural resources.
A casual inspection of the trade balance (18) already indicates that development
increases the size of the market. An expansion in the production of natural resources
strengthens the income side of the balance. As manufactured goods are normal, the
expenditure on them (yi) goes up. In particular, in the symmetric equilibrium we have
∂yi
∂Si
= PR − PRdCRi
dSi
> 0 (19)
The expression (19) simply tells that after development the region increases its net
exports of natural resources, which allows extra consumption of manufactured varieties.
It is also easy to derive an explicit expression for yi. Given the Cobb-Douglas utility
function (1) the expenditure and income shares of manufactured goods and natural
resources are µ ≡ α
α+β
and 1− µ, respectively. As all consumers are assumed to own an
equal share of the capital stock, both regions get half of the capital income, coming from
the manufacturing sector. Income from natural resources is, on the other hand, divided
according to the regional production shares. Noting that aggregate capital income is
equal to unity, we can now see that the expressions for regional aggregate incomes take
the form
Yi =
1
2
+ si
1− µ
µ
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where
si ≡ Si
S1 + S2
(20)
is the share of region i in the supply of natural resources. As consumers spend the share
µ of their income on manufactured varieties, the indices of the size of the market can be
expressed as follows
yi =
1
2
µ+ si(1− µ) (21)
Now, it is easy to see that converting non-tradable amenities into tradable natural
resources increases market size:
∂yi
∂Si
= (1− µ) 1− si
S1 + S2
> 0 (22)
Next, plugging (21) into (10) shows that the region producing more natural resources,
and enjoying a lower quality of the environment, succeeds in attracting a larger share of
manufacturing Þrms
ni =

0 if si < 12 − 12 1−φ1+φ 11−µ
1
2
+ 1+φ
1−φ(si − 12)(1− µ) if si ∈ [12 − 12 1−φ1+φ 11−µ , 12 + 12 1−φ1+φ 11−µ ]
1 if si > 12 +
1
2
1−φ
1+φ
1
1−µ
(23)
Thus although the manufacturing sector is clean, environmental policy aﬀects Þrm loca-
tion. Finally, substituting the expressions (22) into the Þrst order conditions character-
izing decentralized environmental policy gives
Si
Qi
=
β
γ
µ
1 +
1
2
µ
σ − 1
¶
for i = 1, 2 (24)
As the expression (24) indicates, decentralized decision-making results in an ineﬃcient
equilibrium, with too much development and too little preservation. The drive towards
the race to the bottom is the stronger, the larger the expenditure share of manufactured
varieties µ. On the other hand, the harder it is for consumers to substitute one manu-
factured variety for another, the more important it is to decrease the share of imports;
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thus a small elasticity of substitution σ reinforces the incentives to abuse environmental
policy.
The main result of this section can be stated as follows:
Proposition 1 When amenities are non-tradable and natural resources tradable, decen-
tralized environmental policies are socially non-optimal. In equilibrium there is too little
preservation and too much development.
6 Efficient equilibrium
To highlight the role of international (non)tradability in the generation of distortions, this
section analyzes situations where both natural resources and environmental amenities are
either non-tradable or tradable. We start with the former case.
If natural resources (or more generally the end products of development) cannot be
traded internationally, in equilibrium regional consumption of both amenities and natural
resources must be equal to regional production:
Ei = Qi, CRi = Si, i = 1, 2
Since only manufactured goods enter international exchange, the balance of payments
becomes
yi =
1
2
, i = 1, 2 (25)
From (25) it is easy to see that environmental policy has no eﬀect on the size of the market
yi. Development simply increases local consumption of natural resources, while lowering
the quality of the environment. As there are no demand spillovers to the manufacturing
sector, there is no reason to abuse environmental policy. Plugging
∂yi
∂Si
= 0
into the Þrst order conditions (16) tells that the regions follow socially optimal policies.
Next we move to the case, where both natural resources and environmental amenities
are tradable. Although the services provided by the clean environment cannot typically
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be transported from one country to another, there may be some indirect ways to make
them internationally exchangeable. Interregional (eco)tourism oﬀers one possible means
to circumvent non-transportability. On the other hand a pristine ecosystem, with high
biodiversity, can provide genetic material, which may prove valuable in the development
of pharmaceutical products and other tradable goods. A third possible way to com-
bine tradability and preservation is then presented by some primary industries, such as
hunting or reindeer husbandry.
When all sectors produce internationally tradable goods, the balance of payments
takes the form
yi + PRCRi + PEEi =
1
2
+ PRSi + PEQi i = 1, 2
where PE is the price of amenities. Now environmental policy may aﬀect market size
yi through two main channels. First, with given prices PR and PE, a reallocation of
environmental resources may increase of decrease regional income. Second, there is a
terms of trade eﬀect, as prices PR and PE change. For our analysis of (non)tradability
issues, the Þrst eﬀect is more relevant. With a suitable choice of assumptions, the terms
of trade eﬀect can be ignored. First this can be done if the regions are small players
in natural resource and amenity markets. Thus we can think that our two-region model
is only a small part of a larger economy. Second, even when the regions are large, the
terms of trade eﬀect vanishes30 in the symmetric equilibrium where the identical regions
adopt identical environmental policies; this is because in equilibrium there is no (net)
trade outside the manufacturing sector and
∂PR
∂Si
(Si − CRi) = ∂PE
∂Si
(Qi −Ei) = 0 i = 1, 2
Now the eﬀect of environmental policy on market size is given by
∂yi
∂Si
= PR − PE − PRdCRi
dSi
− PE dEi
dSi
(26)
30The manipulation of terms of trade is a well understood motivation for strategic environmental policy
(see e.g. Rauscher 1997). To focus on the non-tradability of amenities, we have chosen a symmetric
model formulation, where this eﬀect does not arise.
18
where the expression (26) holds, (i) under the small region assumption or (ii) under
symmetric environmental policies. The Þrst part PR − PE tells how development aﬀects
national income, with given prices. This eﬀect is positive (negative) if and only if the
relative price PR/PE of natural resources in terms of amenities is greater (smaller) than
one. In general, both alternatives are possible. However, in the social optimum
MRS =
PR
PE
=MRT = 1
where the last equality follows from the linear trade-oﬀ (2) between natural resources
and amenities. Thus if environmental policies are set optimally, gains in natural resource
revenues are exactly cancelled out by the losses on the amenity side.
The second part of (26) −PR dCRidSi − PE dEidSi then indicates how much the expenditure
on natural resources and environmental amenities changes. In the social optimum also
this part goes to zero. This is evident if the regions are small: as neither regional income
nor market prices change, also demand remains unaltered. In the case of large regions,
notice that a small deviation from the social optimum preserves the symmetry between
the regions, as (i) regional incomes do not change and (ii) both regions face the same
market prices. Then we can conclude that development increases the consumption of
natural resources and cuts down the consumption of amenities in both regions:
dEi
dSi
= −dCRi
dSi
, i = 1, 2
Then as under optimal policies PR = PE, the term −PRdCRidSi − PE dEidSi vanishes. As a
conclusion we can then state that under socially optimal policies
∂yi
∂Si
= 0 i = 1, 2 (27)
Then, as there are no demand spillovers to the manufacturing sector, the regions do not
face incentives to abuse environmental policy.
Given the Cobb-Douglas utility function, we can also derive an explicit formula for
market size. Following the same steps as in the previous section yields
yi =
1
2
+ β
µ
si − 1
2
¶
+ γ
µ
qi − 1
2
¶
i = 1, 2 (28)
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where si is given by (20) and
qi =
Qi
Q1 +Q2
is the share of region i in the supply of amenities. Then under symmetric environmental
policies we have
∂yi
∂Si
=
1
4
µ
β
Si
− γ
Qi
¶
i = 1, 2 (29)
The expression (29) repeats the argument we already presented above: Development
raises natural resource sales, but at the same time amenity revenues go down. While
in general either eﬀect may dominate, in the social optimum, characterized by (14), the
two sides cancel out each other and ∂yi
∂Si
= 0.
The results of this section can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 If both amenities and natural resources are either tradable or non-tradable,
the decentralized equilibrium is socially optimal.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper suggested that, in an economy characterized by increasing returns to scale
and costly transportation, the fact that environmental amenities are internationally non-
tradable may distort decentralized environmental policy. Individual countries or local
jurisdictions may have incentives to use too big a share of environmental resources as
inputs in the production of tradable goods. The aim of the strategic environmental
policy is to increase the size of the domestic market in order to attract new Þrms and
industries. We also showed that these distortions vanish, if (i) also the end products
of development are non-tradable, or (ii) if there are technologies allowing environmental
amenities to enter international trade.
Appendix
In this appendix we Þrst characterize regional environmental policies in the symmetric
equilibrium, and then analyze the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
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The derivation of equation (15)
This section derives the Þrst order conditions (15) characterizing regional environmental
policies in the symmetric equilibrium.
Let Vi(Si, Sj), i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j, be the indirect utility function of a representa-
tive consumer residing in region i. Vi(Si, Sj) is deÞned by
Vi(Si, Sj) = max
yi,CAi,Ei
U
µ
yi
Pi
, CRi, δEi + (1− δ)Qi
¶
(30)
+λi
·
1
2
+ PRSi + PEQi − yi − PRCRi − PEEi
¸
where PR is the price of natural resources, PE is the price of (tradable) amenities, δ is
an indicator function, which takes the values
δ =
 1 if amenities are tradable0 otherwise
and λi is the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint. The Þrst order conditions
of consumer maximization are
∂U
∂CMi
= λiPi,
∂U
∂CRi
= λiPR, δ
∂U
∂Ei
= λiPE (31)
Region i sets its environmental policies Si so as to maximize the welfare of its citizens,
while taking the policies followed by the other region as given.
max
Si
Vi(Si, Sj)
subject to (1), (4), (10), (12)
The Þrst order condition is of the form
∂Vi
∂Si
= λi
·
PR − PE + ∂PR
∂Si
(Si − CRi) +
∂PE
∂Si
(Qi − Ei)
¸
− (1− δ) ∂U
∂Ei
+
∂U
∂CMi
∂CMi
∂Pi
∂Pi
∂ni
∂ni
∂yi
∂y
∂Si
(32)
= 0
Next, plug in the Þrst order conditions of consumer maximization (31), and notice that,
as the regions are identical, the terms of trade eﬀects ∂PR
∂Si
(Si − CRi) and ∂PE∂Si (Qi − Ei)
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vanish in the symmetric equilibrium. Then the Þrst order condition (32) takes the form
(15) appearing in the main text:
∂U
∂Ei
=
∂U
∂CRi
+
∂U
∂CMi
∂CMi
∂Pi
∂Pi
∂ni
∂ni
∂yi
∂yi
∂Si
The existence and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium
This appendix establishes that the environmental policy game has a symmetric, socially
eﬃcient equilibrium in pure strategies, if both amenities and natural resources are trad-
able.31 We also state a simple suﬃcient condition for the existence of a symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium under the basic set of assumptions, with tradable natural resources
and non-tradable amenities. Finally we show that if a symmetric equilibrium exists, it
is also the only equilibrium of the model in pure strategies.
We begin by writing down the indirect utility functions in an explicit form:
Vi (Si, Sj) = P
−α
i vi (Si, Sj) (33)
where the price index Pi is given by (11),
vi (Si, Sj) =
 vNi (Si, Sj) ≡ Ay
α+β
i (S1 + S2)
β Qγi if amenities are non-tradable
vTi (Si, Sj) ≡ Byi (S1 + S2)β (Q1 +Q2)γ if amenities are tradable
and A and B are (unimportant) constants, which depend on the parameters α, β and
γ. It is worth noting that (up to a constant multiplier) vi (Si, Sj) is the indirect utility
function of region i in a hypothetical economy, where capital is immobile.
Next, let S1 = S2 = bS be the putative symmetric equilibrium of the environmental
policy game. If amenities are tradable, bS = S∗ is the solution to (14), while with
non-tradable amenities bS = S∗∗ is given by (24). Also let SL and SH be implicitly
deÞned by yi
³
SL, bS´ = φ1+φ and yi ³SH , bS´ = 11+φ . If region j follows the putative
equilibrium strategy, Sj = bS, and region i sets Si ≤ SL (Si ≥ SH), there will be
31A symmetric eﬃcient equilibrium also exists, when both amenities and natural resources are non-
tradable. Showing this is straightforward, since under these assumptions environmental policy never
aﬀects the location choices of manufacturing Þrms.
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no manufacturing in region i (region j); the Þrm location subgame has an end point
equilibrium. If Si ∈ (SL, SH) the subgame has an interior equilibrium. Notice that
SL < bS < SH .
Now assume that country j adopts the strategy Sj = bS. Then the objective function
of country i takes the form
Vi
³
Si, bS´ =

φ
α
σ−1 vi
³
Si, bS´ when Si ∈ [0, SL]
(1 + φ)
α
σ−1 y
α
σ−1
i vi
³
Si, bS´ when Si ∈ (SL, SH)
vi
³
Si, bS´ when Si ∈ [SH ,ω]
(Remember that τ = φ
1
1−σ ). It is easy to show that the constituent functions φ
α
σ−1 vi
³
Si, bS´,
(1+φ)
α
σ−1 y
α
σ−1
i vi
³
Si, bS´ and vi ³Si, bS´ are single-peaked on Si ∈ [0,ω]32. Next we study
under what conditions also Vi
³
Si, bS´ is single-peaked, with the maximum at Si = bS.
We begin with the case where amenities are tradable. The analysis of the main text
shows that (1 + φ)
α
σ−1 y
α
σ−1
i vi (Si, S
∗) reaches its peak at Si = S∗ (as S1 = S2 = S∗ is
the putative eﬃcient equilibrium of the model). But also vi (Si, S∗) (and φ
α
σ−1vi (Si, S
∗))
has its maximum at Si = S∗. This is easy to understand, when we recall that vi (Si, Sj)
is the objective function of region i in an economy with no capital mobility. In such
an economy there are no strategic incentives to abuse environmental policy, in order
to attract manufacturing Þrms. Thus if region j makes the socially eﬃcient choice
Sj = S
∗, also region i Þnds it optimal to set Si = S∗. Now, Vi (Si, S∗) is constructed
by compiling three single-peaked functions, which all have their maximum at Si = S∗.
As a consequence also Vi (Si, S∗) is single-peaked, with the maximum at S∗. But then
Si = S
∗ is the best response to Sj = S∗, and the policy choices S1 = S2 = S∗ form an
equilibrium.
Next we turn to the situation where amenities are non-tradable. The analysis of
the main text indicates that (1 + φ)
α
σ−1y
α
σ−1
i vi (Si, S
∗∗) has its peak at Si = S∗∗ (as
S1 = S2 = S
∗∗ is the putative ineﬃcient equilibrium of the model). However vi (Si, S∗∗)
(and φ
α
σ−1 vi (Si, S
∗∗)) reaches its maximum at some Si = eS < S∗∗. This is because
32The second derivative is always negative at an interior extreme point. As the functions are contin-
uous, there can be at most one interior extreme point (a maximum).
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the no-capital-mobility objective function does not embody any strategic incentives
to overdevelop, in order to attract manufacturing Þrms. Now, if eS < SL, the function
Vi (Si, S
∗∗) is dual-peaked, with two local maxima at Si = eS and Si = S∗∗. Depending on
circumstances, either eS or S∗∗ can be the global maximum of Vi (Si, S∗∗), and Si = S∗∗
is not necessarily the best response to Sj = S∗∗.
A simple way to guarantee that there is a symmetric equilibrium in pure strate-
gies is to focus on situations, where the Þrm location subgame always has an inte-
rior equilibrium, independently of environmental policies. Then Vi (Si, S∗∗) = (1 +
φ)
α
σ−1 y
α
σ−1
i vi (Si, S
∗∗) for Si ∈ [0,ω], and the objective function of region i is evidently
single-peaked and reaches its maximum at Si = S∗∗. Thus what we want is that
yi (Si, Sj) ∈
³
φ
1+φ
, 1
1+φ
´
for all Si, Sj ∈ [0,ω]. As yi (Si, Sj) = 12µ + (1− µ) si, when
amenities are non-tradable, it is easy to show that the requirement is met if and only if
1
2
µ ≥ φ
1 + φ
.
Thus a symmetric equilibrium is more likely to exist, when the income share of manu-
facturing (µ) is large and trading costs are not too small (i.e. the freeness of trade
parameter φ is not too close to unity).
Even when the condition 1
2
µ ≥ φ
1+φ
is not satisÞed, a symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies still exists, if Vi (S∗∗, S∗∗) ≥ Vi
³eS, S∗∗´, or equivalently
(1 + φ)
α
σ−1
µ
1
2
¶ α
σ−1
vNi (S
∗∗, S∗∗) ≥ φ ασ−1 vNi
³eS, S∗∗´ .
It is easy to see that this inequality is more likely to hold, when φ is small and trade is
not too free. (Notice that the local maxima S∗∗ and eS are unaﬀected by changes in the
parameter φ, which only enters the objective functions as a multiplier.)
The Þnding that a symmetric ineﬃcient equilibrium in pure strategies is more likely
to exist, when trade is costly is rather intuitive. First, with high transportation costs,
it is not likely that all manufacturing Þrms cluster in the region with the bigger market:
it is diﬃcult to serve the smaller market from the center, and Þrms relocating to the
periphery tend to earn higher proÞts. Thus the interior equilibrium in the Þrm location
game, and the strategic incentives to abuse environmental policy. Second, a putative
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deviation from Si = S∗∗ to Si = eS involves giving up the manufacturing sector, in order
to achieve a better allocation between amenities and natural resources. It is evident that
this strategy is less likely to pay oﬀ, if trade in manufacturing products is costly.
If the model does have a symmetric equilibrium, this is also the unique equilibrium
in pure strategies. The model does not have any asymmetric pure strategy equilibria.
The proof is simple. Assume that Si = S, Sj = S, where S >S, is an equilibrium.
Then, given the value functions (33), it is easy to show that if the Þrst order condition
holds for region i, ∂Vi
¡
S, S
¢
/∂Si = 0, it fails to hold for region j, ∂Vj
¡
S, S
¢
/∂Sj > 0.
Likewise ∂Vj
¡
S, S
¢
/∂Sj = 0 implies Vi
¡
S, S
¢
/∂Si < 0. If a symmetric equilibrium in
pure strategies does not exist, there can be only mixed strategy equilibria.
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